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Class Position and Economic Behavior in a Tunisian Village:
Selective Separability in a multi-factor household model
Abstract
The purposes of this paper are twofold.  First, we examine, using a unique dataset collected in
the Tunisian village of El Oulja, what might be termed "all or nothing" separability (Benjamin,
1992) by testing, while controling for plot characteristics (Udry, 1996), the proposition that
farm input use is independent of household characteristics.  Second, we test for separability in
the context of a model of class structure based on the seminal work of Eswaran and Kotwal
(1986).  In order to do so, we construct a model of class structure which offers an appealing
representation of the typology of household types in the village when they are classified in
terms of (i) their hiring in of wage labor, and (ii) their hiring out of family labor.  We use a
two-stage estimation technique in which we first estimate the probability of class membership
as a function of household characteristics using discrete choice methods.  In the second stage
we estimate labor intensity per hectare using a Lee-Heckman procedure in which the inverse-
Mill ratio from the first stage is included as an additional explanatory variable.  As with the
case of the test for "all or nothing" separability, the test for selective separability involves
exclusion restrictions on household characteristics, although these are now conditional on class
membership.
Our empirical results strongly support the selective separability hypothesis as well as our
theoretical model: most of the "action" in terms of non-separability stems, as one would expect
from the model, from the class of "self-cultivators" who neither hire in wage labor nor hire out
family labor.  Our paper extends the work of DeJanvry, Sadoulet and Benjamin (1996) on
Mexican ejidatarios to plot- as opposed to household-level estimation.  Moreover, our paper
provides an elaboration on and an empirical bridge to theoretical models, such as Roemer
(1982), Eswaran and Kotwal (1986), and Carter and Zimmerman (1995) which examine how
credit constraints and imperfections on factor markets shape the class structure of the agrarian
economy.  The implications and scope for government intervention in the context of market
imperfections are also examined.3
1.  INTRODUCTION
A common practice in the empirical investigation of agricultural production is to
assume that consumption and production decisions are separable.
1 This is because separability
is equivalent to assuming that peasant household production behavior is determined by profit-
as opposed to utility-maximizing behavior. The theoretical underpinning for this practice is that
input markets are complete and perfectly competitive.  Although substantial evidence has been
presented to support this theory,
2  there also are arguments favoring incomplete or imperfectly
competitive markets.
3  If input markets were indeed incomplete or imperfect, then household
characteristics would be important determinants of farm input use and consequently the
consumption and production decisions of peasant households would not be separable.
The first purpose of this paper is to examine what might be termed "all or nothing"
separability by testing the proposition that farm input use is independent of household
characteristics.   The second purpose of this paper, building on the work of Bedi and Tunali
(1995) and DeJanvry, Sadoulet and Benjamin (1996), is to extend the discussion of separability
to situations in which households transact on more than one market simultaneously (the
previous literature has explicitly or implicitly held all other factor of production as exogenously
fixed while testing for separability on one factor demand equation at a time.  In this respect,
our paper provides an elaboration on and an empirical bridge to theoretical models, such as
Roemer (1982), Eswaran and Kotwal (1986), and Carter and Zimmerman (1995) which
examine how credit constraints and imperfections on factor markets shape the class structure
of the agrarian economy.
Previous work on testing (directly or indirectly) the "all or nothing" separation
hypothesis includes Pitt and Rosenzweig (1986), Arayama (1986), Lopez (1986), Jacoby
(1993), and Benjamin (1992).  All these studies focus exclusively on the labor market.  They
test the "all or nothing" separation hypothesis by examining either the returns to on- and off-
farm employment or the effects of household composition on farm labor allocation.  With
respect to testing the "all or nothing" separation hypothesis, our paper differs from these
previous studies in four respects.
First, failure of separation is likely to affect all inputs as well as farm output, while the
usual procedure has been to focus on the labor market. We have data on the use of several
                                               
1 See the collection of papers collected in Singh, Squire, and Strauss (1986).
2 The most notable recent example is Benjamin (1992), who also gives representative references from the
literature.
3 See, for example, Udry (1996) and the references cited therein.4
inputs, as well as on farm output, so we can implement a more powerful test for separation
through estimating multiple equations and testing the separation hypothesis in each of these
equations.  Second, since plots may be cultivated under tenancy contracts, the term of the
contracts and the monitoring activities of the landlord may have effects on input use and on
farm output.  If these effects were not controlled for, the test for separation would be biased.
Given that we have detailed data on the terms of the contracts as well as on the landlord’s
monitoring and agricultural management activities, we can control for these effects by
explicitly including these variables in regression equations estimated at the plot level (the only
other paper we are aware of which test for separability using plot-level, as opposed to
household-level, data is Udry (1996)).  Moreover these additional, plot-specific, characteristics
may provide important information which will mitigate omitted variable bias which has been a
source of concern in recent work.
4  Third, farm households may opt not to use certain inputs.
When this happens, the use of these inputs are recorded as zero.  This will be particularly
common when working with data at high levels of disaggregation and at the plot level, as we
do.  Econometrically, this means that these inputs are subject to a left censoring problem.  If
this problem is not dealt with properly, the test for separation is biased.  We use tobit
regression techniques to control for censoring bias.  Fourth, while household composition is an
important determinant of input use under nonseparation, other household characteristics (e.g.
land ownership or the human capital of household members) may also be important.  The test
for separation would be more powerful if these other characteristics were included in the
regressions.  We include these other characteristics in the input use and output equations.
Consideration of these additional factors which may lie behind the potential rejection of "all or
nothing" separability also allows us to paint a more detailed picture of the nature and operation
of various markets in the Tunisian village we will be considering.
An simple empirical model that incorporates these extensions is developed and
estimated on a rich plot-level dataset from the Tunisian village of El Oulja. We first pool data
on plots producing heterogeneous crops for two years (1986 and 1993), and test for "all or
nothing"  separation. We find that household characteristics are insignificant in the output and
total labor input equations, but that they are significant in other input equations as well as in
disaggregated male labor and female labor input equations. These results clearly reject the "all
or nothing" separation hypothesis. However, these results may be biased because of pooling of
(i) heterogeneous crops, and (ii) data from different agricultural years. To test the robustness
of our results, we also estimate the model separately for the 1986 and 1993 agricultural years.
Still, we find in favor of "all or nothing" nonseparation. We then estimate the model for a
subsample of plots producing wheat across the two sample years,  as well as for the 1986 and
                                               
4 For example, Benjamin (1994) notes that ommitted land characteristics may be an important source of bias
leading to the well-known inverse relationship between land size and input use.5
1993 years separately. We now find that the impact of household characteristics is more
pronounced in both the output and total labor input equations. They are also significant in
other input equations. This leads us to conclude that the consumption and production decisions
are "all nothing" nonseparable, at least in El Oulja.  To summarize, "all or nothing" separation
is inherently linked to market completeness and perfection and its difference from
nonseparation can be characterized by a set of exclusion restrictions.  These exclusion
restrictions allow us to test the "all or nothing" separation hypothesis.
The second purpose of our paper, namely to test for separability in the context of a
model of class structure, extends the work of DeJanvry, Sadoulet and Benjamin (1996) on
Mexican ejidatarios to plot- as opposed to household-level estimation.  As with "all or
nothing" separability, this allows us to control for plot characteristics which would be a
potential source of ommitted variable bias in houeshold-level estimation.  We construct a
simple model of class structure, in the spirit of Eswaran and Kotwal (1986), which would
appear to offer a reasonable approximation of the typology of household types when they are
classified in terms of (i) their hiring in of wage labor, and (ii) their hiring out of family labor.
We use a two-stage estimation technique in which we first estimate the probability of class
membership as a function of household characteristics using a multinomial probit procedure.
In the second stage we estimate labor intensity per hectare using a Lee-Heckman procedure in
which the inverse-Mill ratio from the first stage is included as an additional explanatory
variable.  As with the case of the test for "all or nothing" separability, the test for selective
separability involves exclusion restrictions on household characteristics, although these are
now conditional on class membership.  Our empirical results strongly support the selective
separability hypothesis as well as our theoretical model: most of the "action" in terms of non-
separability stems, as one would expect from the model, from the class of "self-cultivators"
who neither hire in wage labor nor hire out family labor.  It is not surprising to find that the
marginal productivity of labor for these self-cultivators is a function of their endowments of
land and labor.
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 presents a simple theoretical framework
for demonstrating the "all or nothing" separability result.  Section 3 specifies the econometric
model for testing for "all or nothing" separability; we then discuss the resulting empirical
results.  Section 4 provides a simple theoretical model which is consistent with the observed
class structure of El Oulja, at least with respect to participation in the family and hired labor
markets; we then implement this model empirically and present our results. Section 5
concludes the paper.6
2. ALL OR NOTHING SEPARABILITY
In this section, we will use a simple model to demonstrate the basic separability result.
Let  (;) Uca denote the household utility function, where  c is consumption and the vector  a
parameterizes the utility function and summarizes household characteristics.  We assume that
a is exogenous.  Let  (,;,) FAXTb denote the production function, where  ALH =+  is the
sum of family (L) and hired (H ) labor,  X  is a vector of other inputs such as fertilizer, seeds,
plowing, and transportation, while land, denoted by T , is assumed fixed and exogenous.  The
vector b  parameterizes the production function and summarizes land characteristics; b  is also
assumed to be exogenous.  As will become clear below, the assumption that hired and family
labor are perfect substitutes is an extremely strong assumption which, though commonly made,
is not innocuous.
Suppose that the prices of hired labor  H  and off-farm labor  O L  are equal to  w and
that the prices of purchasing other inputs  X  are equal to  p .  The household has an
endowment of family labor equal to 
e L  and exogenous income  y .  Let the price of output be
the numéraire.  The farmer allocates his endowment of labor between work on the farm and
work off the farm.
5  He can also hire labor to produce output that he sells in a competitive
market.  Since agricultural production takes time, we assume that production takes place
during the period and consumption takes place at the end of the period.  The household’s
budget constraint is given by
(1) (,;,) O cFAXTbwHpXwLy =--++ ,
while its labor endowment allocation constraints are given by
(2)
e
O LLL += and  ALH =+
Since production takes place before consumption, the household only has income  y  available
to purchase inputs and hire labor if credit markets do not exist; in this case, the household is
subject to the liquidity constraint  wHpXy +£ .  Credit can easily be introduced into the
discussion by assuming that the right-hand-side of the constraint is a function of the availability
of credit which is itself a function of wealth or land ownership, an issue we shall delve into in
some detail in section 5.  If off-farm employment opportunities are limited, the household may
also be subject to the constraint  O LL £ % , where  L %  denotes the maximum number of hours the
farmer can work off-farm.  To summarize, when input markets are incomplete or imperfect,
                                               
5 One can easily extend the model to incorporate labor-leisure choice, in effect endogenizing  L
e
, but we will
refrain from doing so here in order to illustrate the separability result as transparently as possible.7
there are other constraints in addition to (1) and (2) that households will be subject to.  In what
follows, we will not spell out the details of the imperfections that give rise to these conditions.
Instead, we will summarize potential constraints associated with household-specific
characteristics in the form of the inequality:
(3) (,,,,,)0 O hLHLXwp£ .
The farmer’s problem is to maximize household utility  (;) Uca subject to constraints (1), (2)
and (3).  Let l  denote the Lagrange multiplier associated with (3).  The first order conditions








where  ,,, O LHLX q = .  The coefficient l  is nonzero when (3) is binding.  Solving (4) gives
(5) ( ) ,,,,, fabAwp ql = .
Note that the multiplier l  can be interpreted as the increase in household utility resulting from
increasing the right hand side of (3) from 0 to 1;  l  is generally a function of  ,,, abA  ,, wp
and  y  if it is nonzero.  This implies that input use is a function of  ,,,,, abAwp and  y .  If  l  is














The solution for  A and  X  from (6) are then independent of  a and  y .  Thus,  a and  y  are
excluded from the input use equations when separation holds and they are not excluded when
separation does not hold.  These exclusion restrictions form the basis of our test for separation.
The simple model above can be extended in several respects, but the exclusion
restrictions which characterize the separable case remain unchanged. First, markets for some
inputs may not exist.
6  When this happens, the corresponding components of  p  are shadow
prices and these shadow prices will be functions of household characteristics  a and  y .
Second, the returns to on- and off-farm employment may differ.  Benjamin (1992) showed that
the exclusion restrictions still hold in this case.  Third, households may farm several plots and
                                               
6 An example in the Tunisian village we are considering is animal manure.  In the Asian context, bullocks are
often cited as the prototypical example of an unmarketed input.  Unmarketed inputs, such as management and
supervision also play a prominent role in certain models of tenancy, such as Eswaran and Kotwal (1985).8
some of these plots may be cultivated under tenancy contracts.  One can show that the above
exclusion restrictions hold true for each plot, provided that the terms of the contracts are
controlled for.
7
3.  ECONOMETRIC IMPLEMENTATION: A FIRST PASS
We implement the test for separation by parameterizing (5) and then testing the
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.
Note that we specify the non-labor input equation (equation (8)) differently from the total
labor input equation (equation (7)).  The reason for this is entirely empirical.  In our data set,
the ratio  / AT  is always positive, but  / XT  frequently takes the value of zero.  Adding the
constant 1 ensures that  ( ) ln(/)1 XA +  is well defined. Further,  ( ) ln(/)10 XA +>  if and only
if  /0 XA >  and  ( ) ln(/)10 XA +=  if and only if  /0 XA = .
8
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where  M L  and  F L  denote the total male and female labor inputs respectively and Y  denotes
output.  The vector Z  contains the following four classes of variables:
— (i) land characteristics (type of soil: clay, red earth, sandy, or barren; and whether
the plot is irrigated);
                                               
7 The only other paper dealing with plot-level (in contrast to household-level) estimation is that by Udry (1996),
although his data pertain solely to owner-operators.
8 An alternative approach is to use a linear instead of a log-linear specification.  In the interest of brevity we do
not present the linear results as they did not differ appreciably from the log-linear results we do present.9
— (ii) household characteristics (household size, the proportion of household members
constituted by prime-age males, the same percentage for females, the age of the
household head, the age of the household head squared, the educational level of the
household head, the average level of education in the household, the maximum level of
schooling among household members excluding the household head, and the amount of
land owned by the household, which is a proxy for wealth);
— (iii) the terms of the contract on each plot of land cultivated by the household under
a sharecropping contract; the terms of the contract are constituted by the ratio of the
cost share borne by the tenant to his output share for (a) family labor, (b) hired labor,
(c) irrigation, (d) plowing, (e) manure, insecticides, pesticides, herbicides, and sulfur,
(f) transportation, (g) chemical fertilizer (regular phosphates, super phosphates and
amonitre), (h) harvesting, and (i) seeds); contract terms also include the frequency of
visits by the landlord to the peasant on plots under tenancy arrangements, whether the
tenant and landlord had a contractual relationship during the previous season, as well as
dummy variables which indicate whether it was the peasant or the landlord who took a
series of key agricultural management decisions;
— (iv) the logarithm of the plot area and a time dummy for the 1986 or the 1993 crop
seasons.
The first two classes of variables are similar to those used by Benjamin (1992) except
that some of them are defined slightly differently and additional characteristics are included.
Household size is the total number of people who live in the same household. Prime-age male
fraction is the ratio of the number of males aged between 14 and 64 divided by household size.
Prime age female fraction is defined analogously.  The separability hypothesis is equivalent to
testing whether the coefficients on the second class of variables equal zero in all equations.
The third class of variables were used by Ai, Arcand, and Ethier (1996) in testing for
the presence of moral hazard in tenancy contracts.  These variables are intended to control for
the possible effects of tenancy contracts and landlord intervention on input use.  The logarithm
of plot size is included to control for the inverse relationship between plot size and productivity
familiar from a number of studies.
9  The time dummy is used to represent the effects of  w and
p  on which the data are not available to us.  Fortunately, in El Oulja,  w and  p  do not vary
across plots and households, but they may vary over time.  The time dummy also captures
other time varying variables such as technical progress.  Note that the contractual variables we
include are the ratios of the cost share borne by the peasant to the output share accruing to
him, for each input over which there is potentially cost-sharing.  This is because the peasant, if
                                               
9 See Bardhan (1973), Berry and Cline (1979), Deolalikar (1981), as well as Rao and Chotigeat (1981).   See
Benjamin (1995) and Udry (1996) for recent explanations of this phenomenon based on omitted land
characteristics.10
he is maximizing profits, takes the effective real price of inputs to be their price multiplied by
his cost share and divided by his output share.
The dependent variables are farm output, total (family and hired) labor use, total
(family and hired) male labor use, total (family and hired) female labor use, seeds, chemical
fertilizers, irrigation and transportation.  Output, seeds, chemical fertilizer, irrigation, and
transportation are expressed in Tunisian dinars per hectare, while labor inputs are expressed in
person-days per hectare.
Results
We estimate (7), (9) and (10) by ordinary least squares regression and (8) and (11) by
tobit maximum likelihood estimation with data pooled from several crops and from the 1986
and 1993 agricultural years. The dataset used in this study comes from a survey conducted by
the authors in 1993 and by Laffont and Matoussi in 1986 in the Tunisian village of El Oulja.
Detailed information on household and plot characteristics, landlord activities on plots under
tenancy arrangements, and contract terms were collected. There are total of 297 households in
the village.  These households cultivated 983 plots of land. Each plot is counted as one
observation. After eliminating observations with missing data as well as plots lying fallow, only
749 plots are used in the estimation. Summary statistics of the data used in estimation are
reported in Table 1. Table 2 reports censoring frequencies for the relevant inputs.
Estimation results for the full sample are presented in Table 3. The null hypothesis that
total labor input per hectare is independent of household characteristics is not rejected by the
data, as shown by the 
2(10) c  test statistic. The same is true of output per hectare and total
male labor input per hectare. On the other hand, the null hypothesis that total female labor
input per hectare is independent of household characteristics is rejected at the 1% level.
Among the nonlabor input equations, household characteristics were found to be significant in
plowing, manure, and seeds at the 5%, 1%, and 5% levels respectively.
Male labor input per hectare is a decreasing function of the proportion of prime-age
females, while the opposite relationship holds for female labor input per hectare.  Thus,
households with a higher proportion of prime-age females tend to use male labor less
intensively and female labor more so.  They also tend to use chemical fertilizer more
intensively, as is indicated by the statistically significant (t=2.50) positive coefficient on the
prime-age female fraction in the chemical fertilizer per hectare equation.  There is also a
statistically significant relationship between female labor input per hectare and family size:11
larger families tend to use less female labor; household size, on the other hand, has no impact
on male labor intensity.  It appears, therefore, that families particularly well endowed with
prime-age female labor use it in agricultural production in substitution for male labor.
Concomitantly, larger families tend to reduce female labor use in agricultural production,
perhaps by redirecting female family labor towards household production activities.  Finally,
note that the human capital variables have very little explanatory power: it is only in the
equation for irrigation input per hectare that the maximum level of schooling and the average
level of schooling in the household are significant at the usual levels of confidence.
These results highlight the importance of testing for separability at a level of
aggregation which does not obscure potential departures from profit-maximizing behavior.
Had we relied solely on the total labor or output per hectare equations, we would not have
rejected the null hypothesis that input use or output is independent of household
characteristics.  Indeed, in so far as the labor demand equations are concerned, the distinction
between male and female labor appears to be crucial.  In the context of a relatively traditional
Islamic society such as rural Tunisia's, this should not come as a surprise.  Moreover, Indian
evidence (Rosenzweig (1980), Bardhan (1984)) indicates that labor supply elasticities differ
substantially by sex and that gender-specific activities render aggregation over both sexes
problematic.
Robustness
Because different crops may use different technologies and because farmers may use
different technologies in different years, the results above may be biased due to pooling. To
check our results for robustness, we re-estimated the model for the following subsamples: (a)
all crops for the year 86; (b) all crops for the year 1993; (c) a subsample of plots producing
wheat for both years; (d) the wheat subsample for the year 1986; and (e) wheat subsample for
the year 93. The results are reported in Table 4 to 8. Note that different sets of regressors were
used in the estimations. This is because, when restricting to a subsample, some regressors are
either zero or perfectly correlated with other regressors, and hence must be dropped. If the
regressors that are dropped are perfectly correlated with included family characteristics, then
the coefficients on family characteristics would be biased and our test of separation would be
inappropriate. Fortunately, for those input equations reported in Tables 4 to 8, the set of
included regressors with which the dropped regressors are perfectly correlated does not
include any of the family characteristics. Thus, the coefficients on these family characteristics
are consistently estimated and our test for separation is the appropriate one.12
For the case of subsamples (a) and (b), the rejection of separation is now stronger that
in the case of the full sample. In addition to some non-labor inputs, household characteristics
are also significant in total labor and total male labor input per hectare and in the output
equation for subsample (a). These results indicate that there might be biases due to pooling
observations from two different crop years, but that these biases are not driving our rejection
of the null hypothesis of separation. For the case of subsamples (c), (d), and (e), the results
show that  there are biases resulting from pooling different crops as well as pooling time series.
However, the separation hypothesis is still rejected.
The result for the wheat subsample are presented in Table 6.  First, note that male labor
input per hectare is a decreasing function of the prime-age female fraction (as in the full sample
results), as well as of the prime age male fraction. This would appear to indicate that families
endowed with above average levels of prime-age individuals hire out a higher proportion of
their labor resources.  This intuition receives support from the output intensity equation.
Output per hectare is a decreasing function of prime age male and prime age female fractions.
Since households with higher prime-age fractions use less male labor per hectare (the same is
true in the total labor per hectare equation), it follows that a greater proportion of household
income may stem from hired out labor: it would appear that households trade less output per
hectare on plots that they cultivate for greater labor income when they are relatively well
endowed in highly marketable prime-age males.  This also indicates that the marginal product
of male labor on farmed plots is not equated to the corresponding wage rate.
10  Note also that,
for the wheat subsample, land ownership (which here represents effects stemming from
differences in wealth) has a positive and statistically significant impact on output per hectare.
This impact appears to stem from a greater use of chemical fertilizer, as indicated by the
positive and statistically significant coefficient on land ownership in the chemical fertilizer per
hectare equation.  In the context of El Oulja, where credit markets are far from perfect, it
would appear quite reasonable to infer that a binding working capital constraint is driving these
results.
11
Female labor input per hectare constitutes the most interesting labor input equation: it
is a decreasing function of household size (as in the full sample). In contrast to male labor,
female labor input per hectare is independent of the prime-age male fraction, while it is an
increasing function of the prime-age female fraction (as in the full-sample results).  Its
relationship to the age of the household head plots out an inverted-U, with the coefficients on
age and age squared both being statistically significant.   Female labor input per hectare is also
                                               
10 This hypothesis is tested explicitly by Jacoby (1993).13
an increasing function of the schooling of the household head, while it is a decreasing function
of the average schooling of household members.  Note also that female labor input per hectare
is unique among the labor input equations in that it does not display the strong inverse
relationship with land size displayed by male and total labor input per hectare.
4. CLASS STRUCTURE AND SELECTIVE SEPARABILITY
While the results we have just presented suggest that the  average behavior in our
sample is consistent with non-separability, it would seem obvious to pose the following
question: are all the households in our sample subject to non-separability or are there
household-specific characteristics which divide households into different categories with
display differing responses with respect to the separability issue?  We are not the first to pose
this question, which constitutes the crux of so-called models of "class structure", although we
are among the first to offer a structural econometric implementation which bridges the divide
between theoretical (Roemer (1982), Eswaran and Kotwal (1986), Carter and Zimmerman
(1995)) and empirical work.  Perhaps the paper closest in spirit to our own is that by DeJanvry,
Sadoulet, and Benjamin (1996) who construct an Eswaran and Kotwal (1986) type model in
which households with differential endowments of labor skills and which are heterogeneous in
the transactions costs they incur in accessing labor markets self select into one of three classes:
labor importers, labor exporters and non-participants.
12
Table 9 presents the agrarian production organization of the Tunisian village of El
Oulja as it appeared in the 1986 and 1993 surveys.  Recall that 
e L  represents the household's
endowment of labor,  L represents family labor used on plots of land cultivated (either as the
owner or as the tenant) by the household,
e LL -  represents family labor hired out,H
represents outside labor hired in by the household, 
e T  is the household's endowment of land,
while T  is the amount of land that it cultivated.  The unit of observation here is the household.
The typology we adopt, classifying households into laborer, self cultivator, laborer-cultivator
                                                                                                                                                  
11 If one refers to section 2, we mean a constraint of the form wL H + pX £ y , where X  is chemical fertilizer
and y is an increasing function of land ownership).
12 Also see Carter (1990), Carter and Wiebe (1993), and Frisvold (1994) for attempts to implement the
Eswaran-Kotwal typology empirically.14
1, laborer-cultivator 2 and small capitalist classes is drawn in part from Eswaran and Kotwal
(1986). Table 10 presents the characteristics of households, according to class membership.
Given that our goal is to derive a theoretical model which is estimable, it is worth
enumerating the minimum requirements that such a model must satisfy for it to provide a useful
description of the class structure in El Oulja.  First, we shall confine our attention to
households which engage in agricultural production: we therefore exclude absentee landlords
and households composed exclusively of wage laborers a priori.  Second, we shall assume that
family labor use is always strictly positive, so as to be in conformity with our data (from which
fallow plots have been purged).  Third, hired labor must be an optional input, again in
conformity with our data.  Fourth, the model must accomodate households which both hire in
wage labor and hire out family labor —the laborer-cultivator 1 class in Table 9; the Eswaran
and Kotwal (1986) model does not allow for this class.  Finally, the model must allow for non-
participation in the labor market, i.e., no hiring out of family labor, no hiring in of wage labor.
A simple model
Consider a standard household production model in which land and family labor are
"essential" inputs in that no agricultural production can take place without them, whereas the
use of hired labor is optional.  In contrast to many treatments of household production, we will
assume that hired and family labor are not perfect substitutes in the production process.  This
additional assumption leads by necessity to one extra constraint in the household's
maximization program, namely, that "exports" of family labor be non-negative.  In addition to
the usual constraints, we shall be assuming that the household must pay for all of its inputs "up
front", so that it is subject to a cash-in-advance constraint.  In the simplest version of the
model, we will be assuming that there is no credit market.
In order to simplify our presentation, we will assume that the household is risk neutral
and maximizes its (linear) utility subject to the above-mentioned constraints.  Its optimization
program is therefore given by:15
(12)
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where  , lm  and h  are the associated Lagrange multipliers.  In order to be able to obtain
closed form solutions for illustrative purposes, we shall assume that the production function
exhibits decreasing returns to scale ( 1 abd ++< ), rather than assuming supervision costs
associated with hired labor as in Eswaran and Kotwal (1986).  Note that this specification can
be thought of as the reduced form of a linearly homogeneous production function where the
inputs are family labor, land, and "effective" hired labor, where effective hired labor,  H % , is
given by  (,,) HHLT q = % , with  0,0,0 HLT qqq >>< .  In order to rule out the division of the
farm into infinitessimally small plots, we shall assume that there are fixed costs, denoted by  F ,
associated with producing on each plot. Forming the Lagrangian, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions
for profit-maximization are given by:
(13)
( ) ( )
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We can then summarize the mapping from endowment space to class structure with the
following proposition (the proof, which is rather tedious, follows from considering the 8
possibilities which arise when one has 3 Lagrange multipliers which can be either zero or
strictly positive):
PROPOSITION 1. The problem posed in (13) admits 8 solutions which may be parametrized in
(,)
ee LT  space and are defined as follows:
— A) Cash in advance constraint binding16
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— B) Cash in advance constraint not binding
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We summarize the model in factor endowment space in Figure 1.  The incorporation of credit
into the preceding model is extremely simple given our assumption of the presence of fixed
costs.  If we denote the working capital available to the household by  B , then the budget
constraint faced by the household becomes: ( ) ( ) 0
ee wLLrTTwHFB -+---+‡;
PROPOSITION 1 is then readily modified by substituting  F  by  FB - .  Note also that while
PROPOSITION 1 yields exclusion restrictions which allow one to identify whether a household
belonging to a given class is credit-constrained or not, it also yields predictions regarding the
sign of the partial derivative of total labor input per hectare with respect to the labor and the18
land endowment.  We will look at these comparative statics later when we discuss the
empirical results.
Empirical implementation
We now implement the simple model of class structure outlined in the previous section.
For the moment, we shall only be considering separability issues in the markets for wage labor
that is hired in and family labor that is hired out.  Let  1,2,3,4 j =  denote the class to which a
household, indexed by  h, belongs to; plots will be indexed by  i.  Class 1 will correspond to
self cultivators, class 2 will correspond to laborer cultivators of the first type, class 3 will
correspond to laborer cultivators of the second type, while class 4 will correspond to small
capitalists. The labor demand per hectare equation for plot  i worked by household  h








b ¢ =+ ,
where  ihj u  is the class-specific disturbance term.   Note that PROPOSITION 1 and the four-fold
partition of household endowment space represented in Figure 1 (cases 1 and 5, cases 2 and 6,
cases 3 and 7, cases 4 and 8) implies a switching regression specification with four régimes and
two indicator functions (this last point arises because each class is defined by two inequalities).
Despite this theoretical specification, we cannot identify the parameters of each indicator
function separately because there are no a priori reasonable exclusion restrictions which would
allow one to have non-overlapping exogenous variables in the two indicator functions.  It
follows that the first-stage in the two-stage Lee-Heckman estimation procedure we implement
yields reduced form coefficients for the indicator functions which cannot unambiguously be
disentangled so as to yield the partition of endowment space.  We implement the first stage of
our procedure by first estimating the probability of a household belonging to a given class
using a multinomial probit procedure.  The dependent variable is the 4-by-1 vector of indicator
variables, while the explanatory variables is the usual matrix of household characteristics.
Though computationally cumbersome (it involves the computation of triple integrals over the
trivariate normal distribution), this procedure yields consistent estimates of the probability of19
class membership, which can then be sustituted in inverse-Mills ratio form so as as to yield
estimates of the slope coefficients  ( ) 1234 ,,, bbbbb =  in the factor intensity equations as well
as their associated standard errors in standard OLS regressions.  Inference can then be
performed on the slope coefficients associated with household characteristics in order to test
the selective separability hypothesis.  Apart from the usual multicollinearity problems, all
coefficients in this second stage are properly identified because of the lack of perfect overlap in
the explanatory variables in the first and second stage estimations.
Results
In interpreting the empirical results in what follows, two lines of though should be kept
in mind.  The first is that testing for selective separability is simply a more precise form of
testing for separability which conditions on the observed class membership of households.  In
this framework, one should interpret the results as tests of the exclusion restrictions implied by
separability, and allow the class structure which has been superimposed on the separability
issue to guide us in identifying those specific households which are responsible for the failure
of "all or nothing" separability to hold.  The second line of thought is more structural in nature
and involves using the estimation results to provide one with a test of the validity of the class
structure approach which is being proposed.  Though it is unreasonable to expect that such a
simple model will provide an explanation for all aspects of labor use, it may help to guide us
toward those specific imperfections which are driving non-separability within the confines of
the class structure framework.
With respect to the exclusion restrictions associated with separability (and associated
with the endowments of labor and land), the results presented in Table 12 indicate that all of
the "action" regarding non-separability stems from the self-cultivator and laborer cultivator 1
classes.  Indeed, the null hypothesis of separability is not rejected for the laborer cultivator 2
and small capitalist classes.  In terms of household composition variables, it is the laborer
cultivator 1 class which is the most interesting.  For this class,which is engaged on both the
hired-in wage labor and hired-out family labor markets, the prime age percentages (both male
and female) are highly significant and negative.  This is consistent with what one would expect:
households which participate on both sides of the labor market and which are particularly well-20
endowed with prime-age individuals will tend to reduce the use of these individuals on the
plots that they farm and will prefer to offer their services on the labor market.  It would seem
likely that, for laborer cultivators of the first type, the marginal productivity of family labor is
smaller than their corresponding wage rate.  These households will thus tend to substitute
hired-in wage labor for the family labor that they hire out.  For the self cultivator households,
which participate in neither market, the failure of separability is not surprising: self cultivators
are households where, by definition, the marginal productivity of both types of labor is not
equated to the market wage rate.
The hypotheses which are associated with PROPOSITION 1 offer a test of the structural
validity of our model of class structure.  It is immediate,  by examining the results presented in
PROPOSITION 1, that a credit constrained self cultivator's labor use per hectare will be a
decreasing function of his land endowment.  This is indeed the case, implying that one potential
source of non-separability for this class is constituted by a binding credit constraint.  If this is
the case, one should also have a positive and statistically significant coefficient on the
household's labor endowment.  This is not the case, the relevant coefficient being statistically
insignificant.  While this might cast doubt on the theoretical validity of the model of class
structure which underlies our estimation, the statistical significance of the household's average
level of schooling suggests that the relevant measure of labor endowment might be the human
capital augmented labor endowment, i.e., the value of the labor endowment, adjusted for labor
quality.  For the small capitalist class, a non-binding credit constraint implies that the total
labor input per hectare will be independent of the household's endowment of land.  That this is
so is readily apparent from the results presented in Table 12.  On the other hand, unconstrained
small capitalists' total labor input per hectare should also be an increasing function of the
household's labor endowment, and this is not the case.
The two laborer cultivator classes provide the most appealing support for our model of
class structure.  In neither case is total labor input per hectare significantly related to either the
land or the labor endowment: this implies that these classes are not subject to a binding credit
constraint and is perfectly coherent with the theoretical model.  On the other hand, and as was
noted above, laborer cultivators of type 1 do not have a separable labor input per hectare
equation.  This implies that the source of non-separability does not lie in a binding credit21
constraint, but rather, as was noted above, in a discrepancy between the marginal productivity
of labor on and off the farm, stemming probably from labor market imperfections.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In contrast to the work on separability undertaken in the Indonesian context by
Benjamin (1992), our results for Tunisia yield a strong rejection of the null hypothesis of "all or
nothing"  separability between consumption and production decisions. This is true for the
entire sample, in which we pool data across crops and across sample years, as well as for
subsamples in which the various sources of heterogeneity bias are eliminated.  Our tests for
selective separability in the context of a model of class structure allowed us to identify two
classes —self cultivators and laborer cultivators of the first type— as the source of non-
separation.  Restriction on parameter estimates implied by our theoretical model also allowed
us to rule out that non-separation in the laborer cultivator of type one class stemmed from a
binding credit constraint.
The results of our paper highlight three important points regarding household models
and the question of separability.  First, in the context of "all or nothing" separability, it is
important to consider input use at a level of disaggregation which does not obscure potential
departures from separability.  Second, estimation at the plot (as opposed to the household)
level is essential if one is to be able to control for plot-specific characteristics, such as soil type
and contractual status, which may have important effects on input use.  Third, departures from
separability may stem from multiple sources, and identifying these is a complex process which
leads to empirical methods which are by necessity much more "structural" than what has been
implemented so far.  If the results in this paper have shown that it is possible to disentangle
various sources of non-separability, then they have also shown that further investigation of the
sources of market failure in the context of LDCs is not pointless, and may indeed be useful.
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Table 1




Output expressed in Tunisian dinars per
hectare
4589.84 10334.10 4.00 110000
Factor inputs
Male  family labor expressed in person-days per hectare 94.17 113.45 1.00 1134.00
Female  family labor expressed in person-days per hectare 27.22 56.94 0.00 480.00
Male  hired labor expressed in person-days per hectare 117.39 260.55 0.00 2310.00
Female  hired labor expressed in person-days per hectare 132.33 362.93 0.00 4180.00
Cost of irrigation expressed in Tunisian dinars per
hectare
277.97 629.77 0.00 9000.00
Cost of ploughing expressed in Tunisian dinars per
hectare
179.13 335.19 0.00 2880.00
Cost of manure and herbicides etc. expressed in Tunisian dinars per
hectare
177.38 423.25 0.00 4500.00
Cost of transportation expressed in Tunisian dinars per
hectare
173.36 413.18 0.00 5400.00
Cost of chemical fertilizer expressed in Tunisian dinars per
hectare
2.76 5.32 0.00 54.24
Cost of harvesting expressed in Tunisian dinars per
hectare
0.08 0.52 0.00 8.50
Cost of seeds expressed in Tunisian dinars per
hectare
0.25 0.49 0.00 6.00
Landlord management inputs
Landlord chooses crop equals 1 when the plot is cultivated
under a fixed rental or sharecropping
tenancy contract and the landlord
choses the crop, equals 0 otherwise
0.13 0.33 0.00 1.00
Landlord chooses timing and type of
plowing
equals 1 when the plot is cultivated
under a fixed rental or sharecropping
tenancy contract and the landlord
choses the quantity, timing and type
of plowing, equals 0 otherwise
0.15 0.35 0.00 1.00
Landlord chooses type and quantity
of seeds, and the timing of sowing
equals 1 when the plot is cultivated
under a fixed rental or sharecropping
tenancy contract and the landlord
chooses type and quantity of seeds,
and the timing of sowing, equals 0
otherwise
0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00
Landlord chooses type, timing and
quantity of transportation
equals 1 when the plot is cultivated
under a fixed rental or sharecropping
tenancy contract and the landlord
chooses type, timing and quantity of
transportation, equals 0 otherwise
0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00
Landlord chooses type, timing and
quantity of fertilizer
equals 1 when the plot is cultivated
under a fixed rental or sharecropping
tenancy contract and the landlord
chooses type, timing and quantity of
fertilizer, equals 0 otherwise




Landlord chooses type, timing and
quantity of manure
equals 1 when the plot is cultivated
under a fixed rental or sharecropping
tenancy contract and the landlord
chooses type, timing and quantity of
manure, equals 0 otherwise
0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00
Landlord chooses type, timing and
quantity of family labor
equals 1 when the plot is cultivated
under a fixed rental or sharecropping
tenancy contract and the landlord
chooses type, timing and quantity of
family labor, equals 0 otherwise
0.03 0.17 0.00 1.00
Landlord chooses type, timing and
quantity of hired labor
equals 1 when the plot is cultivated
under a fixed rental or sharecropping
tenancy contract and the landlord
chooses type, timing and quantity of
hired labor, equals 0 otherwise
0.03 0.17 0.00 1.00
Landlord chooses type, timing and
quantity of irrigation
equals 1 when the plot is cultivated
under a fixed rental or sharecropping
tenancy contract and the landlord
chooses type, timing and quantity of
irrigation, equals 0 otherwise
0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00
Landlord chooses use made of
livestock
equals 1 when the plot is cultivated
under a fixed rental or sharecropping
tenancy contract and the landlord
chooses use made of livestock,
equals 0 otherwise
0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00
Landlord chooses timing of
harvesting
equals 1 when the plot is cultivated
under a fixed rental or sharecropping
tenancy contract and the landlord
chooses timing of harvesting, equals
0 otherwise
0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00
Landlord chooses timing and use of
combine harvester
equals 1 when the plot is cultivated
under a fixed rental or sharecropping
tenancy contract and the landlord
chooses timing and use of combine
harvester, equals 0 otherwise
0.06 0.23 0.00 1.00
Landlord chooses the proportion of
total output to be sold
equals 1 when the plot is cultivated
under a fixed rental or sharecropping
tenancy contract and the landlord
chooses the proportion of total
output to be sold, equals 0 otherwise
0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00
Landlord has final say regarding
decisionmaking on the plot
equals 1 when the plot is cultivated
under a fixed rental or sharecropping
tenancy contract and the landlord has
final say regarding decisionmaking
on the plot, equals 0 otherwise
0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00
Supervision and repeated
interaction
Contract with same landlord in
previous season
equals 1 when the plot is under a
fixed rental or sharecropping tenancy
contract and the tenant had the same
contractual relationship with the
same landlord in the previous
growing season, equals 0 otherwise
0.22 0.41 0.00 1.0026
Supervision by the landlord for plots under sharecropping or
fixed rental contracts: 1 = every day,
2 = twice a week, 3 = once a week, 4
= once or twice a month, 5 = once or
twice a season, 6 = not at all; equals
0 otherwise




Terms of the contract
Percentage of pre-harvesting costs
paid by peasant
for plots under sharecropping or
fixed rental contracts only; equals
100 for owner-operators
90.48 23.52 0.00 100.00
Percentage of harvesting costs paid
for by peasant
for plots under sharecropping or
fixed rental contracts only; equals
100 for owner-operators
93.01 20.36 0.00 100.00
Percentage of manure, herbicide and
insectide cost paid by peasant
for plots under sharecropping or
fixed rental contracts only; equals
100 for owner-operators
88.69 21.17 0.00 100.00
Percentage of irrigation cost paid by
peasant
for plots under sharecropping or
fixed rental contracts only; equals
100 for owner-operators
85.29 28.43 0.00 100.00
Percentage of family labor cost paid
by the peasant
for plots under sharecropping or
fixed rental contracts only; equals
100 for owner-operators
96.60 12.59 25.00 100.00
Percentage of hired labor cost paid
by the peasant
for plots under sharecropping or
fixed rental contracts only; equals
100 for owner-operators
96.39 14.01 0.00 100.00
Percentage of ploughing cost paid by
peasant
for plots under sharecropping or
fixed rental contracts only; equals
100 for owner-operators
82.41 34.90 0.00 100.00
Percentage of seed cost paid by
peasant
for plots under sharecropping or
fixed rental contracts only; equals
100 for owner-operators
89.13 20.88 0.00 100.00
Percentage of transportation cost
paid by peasant
for plots under sharecropping or
fixed rental contracts only; equals
100 for owner-operators
88.96 21.78 0.00 100.00
Percentage of principal crop
accruing to the peasant
for plots under sharecropping or
fixed rental contracts only; equals
100 for owner-operators and tenants
under fixed rental contracts
87.95 21.17 25.00 100.00
Characteristics of land
Clay soil equals 1 when soil is clay, zero
otherwise
0.27 0.44 0.00 1.00
Red earth equals 1 when soil is “red earth”,
zero otherwise
0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00
Sandy soil equals 1 when soil is sandy, zero
otherwise
0.49 0.50 0.00 1.00
“Barren” soil equals 1 when soil is “barren”, zero
otherwise
0.10 0.29 0.00 1.00
Irrigated plot equals 1 when the plot is irrigated,
zero otherwise
0.92 0.27 0.00 1.00
Plot area surface of the plot in hectares 14.80 32.75 0.20 500.0028
Table 2




Female family labor 56.8
Female hired labor 54.1
Male hired labor 32.8







TABLE 3: FULL SAMPLE  (749 OBSERVATIONS)
M.lab Tot. lab Fem.lab Output Irrigation Plowing Manure Chem. fert Seeds
Repeated interaction -0.69 -0.73 -0.87  -0.49 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 0.00
(2.65) (2.62) (1.79) (2.43) (0.53) (2.14) (0.89) (0.40) (0.12)
Choice of crop -1.04 -1.62 -3.36 0.11 -0.26 -0.04 -0.14 -0.46 -0.33
(0.56) (0.81) (1.00) (0.01) (1.47) (0.60) (0.92) (0.92) (1.85)
Choice of plowing 0.68 0.65 0.97 0.64 0.07 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.05
(1.04) (0.94) (0.84) (1.28) (1.09) (0.91) (1.05) (0.11) (0.86)
Choice of transportation -1.20 -1.10 -0.42 1.22 0.02 -0.02 0.03 -0.46 -0.04
(0.75) (0.65) (0.15) (0.26) (0.15) (0.31) (0.21) (1.07) (0.25)
Final decisionmaking on plot 0.90 1.21 2.49 0.51 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.16 0.14
(1.06) (1.32) (1.62) (0.78) (1.17) (0.43) (0.18) (0.68) (1.73)
Landlord visits 0.13 0.15 0.16 0.14 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01
(3.24) (3.39) (2.17) (4.72) (3.01) (1.32) (0.42) (2.23) (1.36)
% of pre-harvesting costs -0.37 -0.35 -0.33  -0.14 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01
(2.52) (2.29) (1.30) (1.30) (0.01) (1.30) (1.82) (0.37) (0.37)
% of fert., herb. and ins. costs 1.33 1.77 4.73 0.62 0.27 -0.01 0.04 0.41 0.21
(0.89) (1.12) (1.50) (0.54) (1.91) (0.17) (0.30) (1.04) (1.47)
% of irrigation costs -0.10 -0.13 -0.27 0.09 -0.05 -0.01 -0.02 -0.07 -0.05
(0.53) (0.62) (0.68) (0.60) (2.47) (1.25) (1.22) (1.40) (2.77)
% of plowing costs -0.10 -0.14 -0.12 -0.05 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.00
(0.61) (0.83) (0.42) (0.38) (0.45) (0.74) (0.01) (0.69) (0.11)
% of family labor costs -0.13 -0.14 0.33 0.16 0.01 -0.01 -0.05 -0.04 0.04
(0.23) (0.23) (0.29) (0.39) (0.17) (0.37) (1.04) (0.30) (0.85)
% of hired labor costs -0.38 -0.41 -0.79 0.17 -0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.13 0.06
(0.85) (0.86) (1.00) (0.50) (0.19) (0.04) (0.22) (1.05) (1.34)
% of seed costs -0.83 -1.09 -3.93 -0.51 -0.17 -0.01 -0.03 -0.35 -0.21
(0.59) (0.73) (1.28) (0.47) (1.28) (0.13) (0.23) (0.92) (1.59)
% of transportation costs -0.40 -0.45 -0.84 -0.05 -0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.12 0.00
(1.10) (1.16) (1.32) (0.16) (0.94) (0.41) (0.16) (1.18) (0.01)
% of harvesting costs 0.32 0.28 0.34 0.11 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.11 -0.11
(0.82) (0.67) (0.49) (0.36) (0.07) (0.33) (0.25) (1.02) (3.03)
Joint signif. of contract vars 28.65 32.75 49.21 24.31 28.18 12.67 9.22 16.36 55.00
Prime-age males 0.12 -0.37 -1.88 -0.25 -0.05 0.00 0.08 0.07 0.04
(0.27) (0.81) (2.35) (0.75) (1.20) (0.04) (2.15) (0.61) (0.94)
Prime-age females -0.97 -0.47 2.99 -0.20 0.03 0.01 -0.01 0.32 0.05
(2.00) (0.90) (3.39) (0.54) (0.62) (0.45) (0.13) (2.50) (1.13)
Household size -0.01 -0.09 -0.59 0.07 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.03 0.02
(0.10) (0.58) (2.11) (0.65) (0.91) (0.84) (0.78) (0.78) (1.40)
Age of head 2.22 2.34 -6.27 -2.99 -0.69 0.40 0.46 -0.17 -0.80
(0.58) (0.57) (0.85) (1.02) (1.86) (3.14) (1.39) (0.16) (2.16)
Age of head squared -2.37 -2.41 5.82 2.37 0.59 -0.34 -0.37 -0.01 0.67
(0.70) (0.67) (0.89) (0.91) (1.78) (3.06) (1.27) (0.01) (2.04)
Schooling of head -0.03 -0.02 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(1.22) (0.62) (0.80) (0.01) (0.94) (0.78) (1.17) (0.56) (0.56)
Max. school. excl. head 0.04 0.04 0.04 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
(1.09) (0.95) (0.59) (0.29) (2.04) (0.96) (0.89) (0.60) (0.51)
Ave. schooling in hh. 0.01 0.01 -0.06 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.00
(0.08) (0.11) (0.47) (0.58) (2.26) (0.52) (1.13) (0.99) (0.65)
Marital status of head 0.15 0.19 0.24 0.19 -0.02 -0.01 0.07 0.01 -0.01
(0.80) (0.95) (0.70) (1.35) (1.27) (1.51) (4.33) (0.12) (0.45)
Land ownership -0.08 -0.09 -0.13 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01
(1.31) (1.43) (1.01) (1.11) (1.53) (0.37) (0.34) (1.23) (1.55)
Joint signif of  hhold chars 12.79 7.45 6.24 31.00 15.70 18.53 40.40 13.86 19.61
Clay soil 0.15 0.29 1.66 -1.49 -0.05 0.00 0.03 -0.06 0.02
(0.26) (0.45) (1.09) (3.28) (0.84) (0.08) (0.70) (0.36) (0.36)
Red earth 0.39 0.55 1.46 -0.96 -0.01 -0.01 0.06 -0.01 0.05
(0.65) (0.87) (0.95) (2.10) (0.13) (0.52) (1.22) (0.09) (0.90)
Sandy soil -0.18 0.01 1.30 -1.44 -0.05 -0.01 0.04 -0.03 0.01
(0.30) (0.02) (0.85) (3.19) (0.76) (0.53) (0.79) (0.22) (0.12)
“Barren” soil 0.18 0.38 2.05 -1.26 -0.04 0.00 0.13 0.08 0.03
(0.30) (0.59) (1.32) (2.73) (0.57) (0.12) (2.72) (0.47) (0.54)
Irrigated plot 2.39 2.74 4.24 1.80 0.25 0.01 0.09 0.19 0.04
(10.83) (11.65) (6.58) (10.69) (7.98) (1.73) (4.45) (3.26) (1.76)
Area of plot -0.56 -0.56 -0.37 -0.21 -0.04 0.00 0.01 -0.04 -0.03
(8.06) (7.60) (2.80) (4.04) (6.08) (0.73) (1.94) (2.28) (4.62)
Year 0.75 0.87 0.85 2.24 0.10 0.08 0.15 0.61 0.06
(3.57) (3.84) (2.12) (13.76) (4.64) (11.99) (8.27) (10.63) (3.13)
Intercept -0.09 -0.28 -2.80 -1.85 0.11 -0.10 -0.47 -0.09 0.17
(0.08) (0.21) (1.08) (1.98) (0.89) (2.61) (4.50) (0.28) (1.44)
2 s 5.27 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.13 0.02
(10.86) (14.31) (15.57) (13.10) (15.20) (14.88)30
TABLE 4. 1993 SAMPLE (415 OBSERVATIONS)
M.lab Tot. lab Output Plowing Manure Chem.fert. Seeds
Repeated interaction -0.49 -0.58 -0.50 -0.04 0.02 0.10 -0.04
(1.13) (1.23) (1.60) (2.03) (0.48) (0.67) (0.76)
Choice of plowing 9.48 9.29 6.21 0.12 0.65 2.09 0.57
(0.93) (0.84) (0.84) (0.27) (0.63) (0.58) (0.45)
Choice of transportation -1.14 -1.10 0.44 0.00 0.02 -0.41 -0.04
(0.64) (0.57) (0.34) (0.04) (0.12) (0.66) (0.18)
Final decisionmaking on plot 5.44 5.33 4.20 0.08 0.44 1.77 0.72
(0.58) (0.53) (0.62) (0.20) (0.48) (0.54) (0.63)
Landlord visits 0.10 0.13 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.01
(1.46) (1.90) (3.12) (1.33) (0.26) (1.56) (1.77)
% of pre-harvesting costs 4.13 5.44 0.75 0.06 0.04 0.88 0.52
(2.02) (2.46) (0.51) (0.73) (0.22) (1.22) (2.06)
% of fertilizer, herb. and insect. costs -8.60 -8.48 -3.77 -0.04 0.23 -0.19 -0.11
(1.34) (1.23) (0.82) (0.13) (0.37) (0.09) (0.14)
% of irrigation costs 0.08 -0.30 0.20 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.19
(0.13) (0.47) (0.48) (0.85) (0.30) (0.19) (2.57)
% of plowing costs 1.31 1.44 0.79 0.03 0.10 0.32 0.16
(0.65) (0.66) (0.54) (0.37) (0.50) (0.45) (0.65)
% of family labor costs -2.92 -3.31 -0.47 -0.03 -0.14 -0.56 -0.08
(1.99) (2.09) (0.44) (0.55) (0.94) (1.08) (0.42)
% of hired labor costs -1.25 -1.34 -0.61 -0.02 -0.10 -0.36 -0.04
(0.67) (0.66) (0.44) (0.19) (0.52) (0.54) (0.17)
% of seed costs 8.88 9.33 3.65 0.03 -0.23 0.22 0.27
(1.39) (1.35) (0.79) (0.10) (0.36) (0.10) (0.35)
% of transportation costs -1.73 -1.84 -0.97 -0.01 -0.14 -0.45 -0.12
(0.75) (0.73) (0.58) (0.15) (0.61) (0.55) (0.42)
% of harvesting costs 0.30 0.35 0.13 -0.01 0.00 0.11 -0.10
(0.64) (0.70) (0.39) (0.33) (0.02) (0.68) (1.72)
Joint signif of  contract vars 20.02 24.82 21.85 8.72 6.45 15.72 44.94
Prime-age males -0.48 -1.08 -0.17 0.00 0.06 -0.03 0.04
(0.79) (1.62) (0.39) (0.14) (1.04) (0.15) (0.57)
Prime-age females -0.53 -0.07 0.62 0.02 0.07 0.61 0.00
(0.73) (0.09) (1.18) (0.69) (0.94) (2.37) (0.02)
Household size 0.09 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.00 0.04 -0.01
(0.39) (0.10) (0.10) (0.69) (0.20) (0.52) (0.38)
Age of head 16.05 15.94 -1.73 0.72 0.53 0.37 -1.28
(2.64) (2.43) (0.39) (2.75) (0.86) (0.17) (1.69)
Age of head squared -14.80 -15.09 1.98 -0.64 -0.44 -0.52 1.09
(2.62) (2.47) (0.48) (2.61) (0.77) (0.26) (1.55)
Schooling of head 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.38) (0.80) (0.46) (0.91) (0.85) (0.02) (0.82)
Max. school. excl. head 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.00
(0.90) (0.33) (0.02) (0.88) (1.02) (0.42) (0.58)
Ave. schooling in hh. 0.04 0.10 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.00
(0.37) (0.90) (0.15) (0.53) (1.11) (0.54) (0.19)
Marital status of head 0.18 0.31 0.07 -0.02 0.08 0.02 -0.05
(0.66) (1.05) (0.38) (1.67) (2.94) (0.21) (1.47)
Land ownership -0.82 -0.53 0.37 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.16
(1.32) (0.79) (0.82) (0.29) (0.69) (0.04) (2.09)
Joint signif of  hhold chars 22.88 21.51 3.51 18.42 21.07 9.50 25.61
Clay soil 0.15 0.27 -1.08 0.01 0.00 -0.28 -0.05
(0.23) (0.37) (2.23) (0.31) (0.05) (1.19) (0.56)
Red earth 0.47 0.61 -0.67 -0.01 0.03 -0.19 0.03
(0.70) (0.84) (1.39) (0.37) (0.43) (0.81) (0.37)
Sandy soil -0.03 0.03 -0.94 -0.01 -0.01 -0.21 -0.07
(0.04) (0.05) (1.98) (0.51) (0.08) (0.93) (0.79)
“Barren” soil 0.53 0.78 -0.76 0.01 0.20 0.11 -0.01
(0.75) (1.03) (1.51) (0.29) (2.89) (0.43) (0.14)
Irrigated plot 1.47 1.84 1.13 0.02 0.08 0.30 0.08
(4.32) (5.00) (4.68) (1.24) (2.28) (2.48) (1.79)
Area of plot -0.74 -0.77 -0.15 0.00 0.00 -0.08 -0.07
(6.75) (6.54) (1.85) (0.33) (0.19) (2.11) (4.83)
Intercept -2.57 -2.56 0.05 -0.10 -0.35 0.30 0.48
(1.54) (1.42) (0.04) (1.44) (2.09) (0.51) (2.27)
2 s 0.00 0.02 0.26 0.03
(10.74) (9.60) (10.35) (10.05)31
TABLE 5. 1986 SAMPLE
Male
labor
Total labor Output Female labor Irrigation Plowing Manure Transp. Chemical
fertilizer
Repeated interaction -0.45 -0.45 -0.46 -0.44 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.02
(1.50) (1.40) (1.75) (1.08) (0.61) (1.02) (2.25) (0.69) (1.31)
Landlord visits 0.15 0.15 0.18 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
(2.93) (2.83) (4.15) (1.35) (0.13) (1.90) (1.65) (0.17) (3.14)
% of pre-harvesting costs -0.17 -0.20 -0.06 -0.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01
(1.14) (1.19) (0.42) (1.23) (0.80) (1.14) (0.07) (0.46) (0.94)
% of fertilizer, herb. and insect. costs 1.86 2.10 1.36 1.84 -0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.08
(1.14) (1.20) (0.95) (0.84) (1.35) (0.43) (0.88) (0.52) (0.92)
% of irrigation costs 0.08 0.13 0.09 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.51) (0.74) (0.62) (1.42) (0.02) (0.08) (1.06) (0.31) (0.10)
% of plowing costs -0.19 -0.25 -0.19 -0.52 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01
(1.28) (1.62) (1.47) (2.13) (0.66) (0.50) (0.04) (0.12) (1.42)
% of family labor costs -0.82 -0.83 -0.58 1.09 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.08
(0.81) (0.76) (0.65) (0.81) (0.59) (0.92) (0.59) (0.66) (1.43)
% of seed costs -1.65 -1.66 -0.96 -2.34 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.09
(1.30) (1.22) (0.86) (1.06) (0.76) (1.60) (1.18) (1.54) (1.41)
% of transportation costs 0.22 0.88 -0.63 1.73 0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.09
(0.20) (0.73) (0.64) (0.88) (1.93) (0.93) (0.37) (1.06) (1.46)
% of harvesting costs 0.41 0.02 0.72 -3.13 -0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.09
(0.32) (0.02) (0.63) (1.69) (1.91) (0.93) (0.55) (1.17) (1.28)
Joint significance of
contractual variables
14.76 15.83 28.95 13.24 13.47 17.82 9.66 11.90 25.28
Prime-age males 0.49 0.08 -0.43 -2.14 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01
(0.72) (0.11) (0.72) (2.29) (0.28) (0.30) (1.10) (0.37) (0.33)
Prime-age females -0.86 -0.17 -0.47 1.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(1.23) (0.22) (0.76) (1.45) (0.73) (0.97) (0.21) (0.06) (0.09)
Household size 0.05 -0.14 0.26 -0.82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02
(0.22) (0.61) (1.38) (2.64) (0.73) (1.00) (1.48) (1.44) (1.89)
Age of head -16.02 -13.73 -8.57 -10.79 -0.03 -0.05 0.01 -0.07 -0.75
(3.25) (2.60) (1.99) (1.63) (0.66) (2.97) (0.21) (1.43) (2.88)
Age of head squared 12.52 10.86 6.09 9.06 0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.06 0.51
(3.00) (2.42) (1.67) (1.60) (0.39) (2.50) (0.37) (1.35) (2.29)
Schooling of head -0.09 -0.08 -0.03 -0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(2.51) (2.16) (1.05) (1.61) (1.39) (3.98) (1.22) (1.19) (2.49)
Max. school. excl. head -0.05 -0.01 -0.08 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.93) (0.13) (1.49) (2.01) (0.20) (2.86) (0.89) (1.93) (1.25)
Ave. schooling in hh. 0.06 -0.03 0.08 -0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.55) (0.29) (0.93) (1.50) (0.01) (3.40) (1.23) (0.75) (0.42)
Marital status of head 0.32 0.20 0.47 -0.15 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02
(1.24) (0.73) (2.06) (0.42) (3.11) (1.33) (2.60) (0.33) (1.48)
Land ownership -0.03 -0.07 0.14 -0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.54) (1.10) (2.66) (2.52) (0.38) (1.55) (1.54) (0.05) (1.36)
Joint significance of
household characteristics
32.40 21.21 21.92 38.78 23.07 26.14 21.50 13.48 33.57
Red earth 0.46 0.40 0.67 -0.86 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02
(1.50) (1.22) (2.52) (1.93) (0.23) (0.13) (0.75) (1.77) (1.43)
Sandy soil -0.27 -0.15 0.04 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
(1.56) (0.80) (0.23) (0.65) (1.90) (1.75) (1.37) (1.75) (0.90)
“Barren” soil -0.08 -0.14 0.31 -0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
(0.28) (0.47) (1.28) (0.29) (0.19) (1.13) (0.26) (0.73) (0.43)
Irrigated plot 3.54 3.80 2.81 3.10 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.05
(12.53) (12.55) (11.37) (4.56) (5.93) (1.15) (4.32) (2.80) (3.65)
Area of plot -0.33 -0.33 -0.30 -0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(3.88) (3.60) (4.00) (0.58) (2.76) (1.82) (4.22) (0.17) (0.43)
Intercept 3.74 3.52 -2.60 2.97 -0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.22
(2.63) (2.31) (2.09) (1.47) (0.60) (4.00) (1.89) (1.10) (2.95)
2 s 1.79 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(7.74) (10.67) (11.27) (8.46) (10.53) (11.11)
Number of observations  334  334  334  334  334  334  334  334  33432










Repeated interaction -1.30 -1.40 0.25 -3.54 -0.03 -0.06 -0.14 0.11
(1.34) (1.41) (0.30) (0.00) (0.99) (1.13) (1.19) (6.50)
Landlord visits 0.20 0.20 0.01 -1.27 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.01
(1.22) (1.15) (0.08) (0.00) (0.25) (0.37) (0.58) (5.11)
% of irrigation costs -1.36 -1.34 -0.25 -2.40 -0.01 0.04 0.03 0.02
(1.68) (1.61) (0.37) (0.00) (0.18) (0.85) (0.32) (1.28)
% of plowing costs -1.37 -1.40 -0.82 -5.69 0.00 0.03 -0.02 -0.01
(1.98) (1.97) (1.39) (0.00) (0.01) (0.68) (0.19) (0.58)
% of family labor costs 0.61 0.52 0.29 3.39 0.02 -0.10 0.04 -0.01
(0.46) (0.38) (0.25) (0.00) (0.35) (1.00) (0.23) (0.48)
% of hired labor costs 0.94 1.39 0.80 9.08 -0.01 0.13 -0.01 -0.04
(0.60) (0.86) (0.59) (0.00) (0.25) (1.22) (0.06) (1.39)
% of seed costs 10.69 10.18 5.81 21.52 0.03 -0.23 -0.16 0.06
(2.46) (2.28) (1.56) (0.00) (0.21) (0.96) (0.31) (0.73)
% of harvesting costs -8.00 -8.09 -4.13 -23.72 0.02 0.23 0.28 -0.01
(2.00) (1.97) (1.20) (0.00) (0.16) (0.99) (0.59) (0.19)
Joint significance of
contractual variables
14.93 15.20 12.32 6.25 5.73 7.88 6.50 55.89
Prime-age males -2.63 -2.62 -2.00 0.91 -0.02 0.10 0.01 -0.03
(3.36) (3.26) (3.03) (0.36) (0.63) (2.50) (0.12) (2.27)
Prime-age females -3.30 -2.99 -1.76 3.68 0.00 0.10 0.00 -0.02
(3.73) (3.28) (2.38) (1.90) (0.06) (2.22) (0.03) (1.57)
Household size 0.12 -0.02 0.35 -2.17 0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.00
(0.46) (0.07) (1.60) (2.96) (0.60) (1.49) (0.77) (1.04)
Age of head 9.70 13.13 3.63 73.59 0.51 0.53 -0.61 -0.21
(1.87) (2.46) (0.82) (2.52) (2.76) (1.99) (0.97) (2.25)
Age of head squared -10.02 -12.66 -3.20 -61.04 -0.43 -0.36 0.35 0.14
(2.20) (2.70) (0.82) (2.44) (2.66) (1.54) (0.63) (1.76)
Schooling of head -0.04 -0.01 0.05 0.42 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
(1.03) (0.28) (1.58) (3.33) (1.09) (3.38) (1.06) (0.68)
Max. school. excl. head 0.07 0.11 -0.04 0.39 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.00
(1.19) (1.76) (0.74) (1.82) (1.91) (1.30) (2.75) (0.31)
Ave. schooling in hh. 0.09 0.01 0.15 -1.18 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.00
(0.82) (0.12) (1.53) (2.44) (1.77) (2.47) (1.71) (0.17)
Marital status of head 0.31 0.27 0.43 -1.13 -0.01 0.03 0.02 0.00
(1.25) (1.05) (2.02) (1.18) (0.67) (2.26) (0.53) (0.21)
Land ownership -0.01 -0.07 0.19 -1.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00
(0.21) (0.91) (3.27) (1.44) (0.04) (0.53) (2.06) (0.70)
Joint significance of
household characteristics
31.20 31.05 42.34 19.48 15.29 26.54 15.16 27.74
Clay soil -0.16 -0.12 -1.61 7.62 0.00 0.03 -0.37 -0.02
(0.28) (0.21) (3.35) (0.00) (0.16) (0.93) (5.57) (1.84)
Red earth -0.15 -0.03 -1.29 11.14 -0.01 0.06 -0.21 -0.02
(0.26) (0.05) (2.65) (0.00) (0.61) (2.11) (3.11) (1.61)
Sandy soil -0.95 -0.74 -1.80 9.75 -0.01 0.04 -0.27 -0.01
(1.72) (1.30) (3.80) (0.00) (0.27) (1.60) (4.12) (1.42)
“Barren” soil -1.47 -1.44 -1.77 1.69 0.01 0.04 -0.26 -0.02
(2.34) (2.22) (3.34) (0.00) (0.38) (1.41) (3.55) (2.08)
Irrigated plot 0.86 0.88 0.94 -0.05 0.00 -0.01 -0.07 0.00
(3.95) (3.94) (5.06) (0.07) (0.12) (1.32) (2.74) (0.79)
Area of plot -0.83 -0.81 -0.62 0.18 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00
(8.06) (7.68) (7.08) (0.60) (1.34) (0.45) (1.04) (1.61)
Year -0.11 -0.13 2.36 -0.19 0.08 0.08 0.31 0.03
(0.36) (0.42) (8.83) (0.17) (6.82) (5.02) (8.18) (5.14)
Intercept 0.35 -0.53 -2.96 -26.43 -0.13 -0.31 0.62 0.11
(0.21) (0.30) (2.03) (0.00) (2.08) (3.47) (3.00) (3.61)
2 s 1.48 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
(2.86) (8.30) (7.71) (8.07) (7.96)
Number of observations 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 14533





Output Plowing Manure Transport. Chemical
fertilizer
Seeds Havesting
Repeated interaction -0.06 -0.04 0.30 -0.06 -0.08 -0.07 -0.01 0.11 -0.03
(0.05) (0.04) (0.40) (1.09) (1.40) (1.01) (0.09) (4.13) (0.76)
Landlord visits -0.06 -0.08 -0.11 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.01
(0.29) (0.39) (0.86) (0.24) (0.47) (0.69) (0.72) (2.63) (0.87)
% of plowing costs -2.62 -2.62 0.80 0.05 -0.03 0.03 0.23 0.02 0.12
(1.26) (1.25) (0.59) (0.51) (0.35) (0.25) (0.85) (0.46) (1.85)
% of hired labor costs 1.51 1.52 -1.40 0.00 0.08 0.05 -0.30 -0.07 -0.02
(0.66) (0.67) (0.94) (0.04) (0.77) (0.38) (1.04) (1.42) (0.26)
% of seed costs 0.74 0.30 -2.25 0.06 -0.83 -0.67 -2.13 0.12 -0.10
(0.11) (0.04) (0.51) (0.17) (2.76) (1.83) (2.41) (0.79) (0.48)
Joint significance of
contractual variables
2.97 3.27 2.44 3.16 23.59 13.31 11.42 23.78 7.23
Prime-age males -2.26 -2.01 0.51 0.02 0.28 0.23 0.40 -0.04 -0.03
(1.47) (1.30) (0.51) (0.26) (4.16) (2.80) (2.05) (1.25) (0.59)
Prime-age females -1.80 -1.58 1.27 0.02 0.12 0.28 0.16 -0.08 -0.16
(1.04) (0.91) (1.14) (0.21) (1.54) (3.06) (0.73) (2.00) (2.77)
Household size -0.35 -0.41 0.12 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.13 0.01 -0.02
(0.71) (0.84) (0.36) (0.69) (0.52) (0.10) (1.99) (0.46) (1.49)
Age of head 21.85 23.23 -1.78 1.19 0.90 0.89 -1.42 -0.27 -0.11
(2.50) (2.66) (0.32) (2.70) (2.13) (1.91) (1.24) (1.35) (0.40)
Age of head squared -22.92 -24.14 1.27 -1.01 -0.61 -0.59 1.06 0.16 0.08
(2.80) (2.94) (0.24) (2.46) (1.56) (1.36) (1.00) (0.88) (0.31)
Schooling of head -0.02 -0.01 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.30) (0.11) (1.04) (0.81) (4.47) (4.41) (0.19) (1.20) (0.31)
Max. school. excl. head 0.03 0.03 -0.06 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.04 0.00 0.00
(0.31) (0.28) (0.87) (2.01) (0.04) (0.39) (3.04) (0.31) (0.86)
Ave. schooling in hh. 0.06 0.04 0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.31) (0.18) (0.25) (2.29) (1.66) (2.45) (0.17) (0.62) (0.56)
Marital status of head 0.66 0.69 0.86 -0.01 0.08 0.07 0.14 0.00 -0.03
(1.54) (1.61) (3.08) (0.37) (4.24) (3.17) (2.47) (0.17) (1.85)
Land ownership -2.49 -2.57 -1.53 0.03 -0.18 -0.16 -0.45 0.02 -0.03
(2.09) (2.16) (2.05) (0.56) (3.37) (2.64) (3.03) (0.86) (0.76)
Joint significance of hh. charact. 19.92 20.84 15.08 18.24 79.62 45.65 37.40 26.77 29.00
Clay soil -0.19 -0.23 -1.28 -0.01 0.02 -0.03 -0.52 -0.04 -0.01
(0.24) (0.30) (2.49) (0.15) (0.49) (0.60) (4.97) (1.98) (0.48)
Red earth 0.09 0.14 -1.13 -0.01 0.04 0.05 -0.33 -0.03 0.04
(0.12) (0.19) (2.40) (0.31) (1.07) (1.15) (3.50) (1.75) (1.67)
Sandy soil -0.36 -0.22 -0.67 0.02 0.09 0.10 -0.18 -0.02 -0.03
(0.46) (0.28) (1.31) (0.40) (2.65) (2.45) (1.74) (1.12) (1.13)
“Barren” soil 0.55 0.63 -0.32 0.01 0.08 0.09 -0.15 -0.05 0.00
(0.57) (0.66) (0.56) (0.16) (2.05) (1.89) (1.31) (2.54) (0.11)
Irrigated plot -0.53 -0.55 0.05 0.02 -0.05 -0.03 -0.22 0.00 0.04
(1.22) (1.28) (0.17) (0.78) (2.85) (1.56) (4.12) (0.43) (3.15)
Area of plot -0.49 -0.47 0.06 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.07 0.00 0.01
(1.98) (1.87) (0.36) (0.34) (3.09) (1.46) (2.17) (0.62) (0.95)
Intercept -1.65 -2.00 -0.98 -0.28 -0.58 -0.51 0.83 0.20 0.19
(0.66) (0.79) (0.59) (2.17) (4.78) (3.77) (2.51) (3.20) (2.31)
2 s 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(4.87) (4.49) (5.04) (4.98) (4.77) (4.52)
Number of observations 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 5334
TABLE 8. WHEAT SUBSAMPLE: 1986
Male labor Total labor Output Plowing Chemical
fertilizer
Seeds
Repeated interaction -10.12 -9.87 -5.06 -0.01 0.13 0.01
(1.85) (1.69) (0.98) (0.32) (0.59) (0.28)
Landlord visits 1.67 1.59 0.94 0.00 -0.03 0.00
(1.80) (1.60) (1.06) (0.35) (0.80) (0.24)
% of plowing costs 1.54 1.45 0.64 0.00 -0.05 0.00
(1.46) (1.29) (0.64) (0.08) (1.30) (1.01)
% of family labor costs 0.71 0.82 -0.21 0.00 0.09 0.00
(0.49) (0.53) (0.15) (0.15) (1.47) (0.51)
% of seed costs -9.87 -9.40 -3.46 0.00 0.35 0.02
(1.15) (1.03) (0.43) (0.14) (1.02) (0.59)
% of harvesting costs 10.60 10.31 5.36 0.01 -0.22 -0.01
(1.47) (1.33) (0.78) (0.23) (0.76) (0.33)
Joint significance of
contractual variables
7.13 6.29 7.80 1.77 15.20 19.16
Prime-age males -2.57 -3.03 -3.17 0.00 -0.04 -0.01
(2.61) (2.87) (3.39) (0.09) (0.95) (1.46)
Prime-age females -3.07 -2.89 -3.23 0.00 -0.02 0.00
(3.13) (2.74) (3.46) (0.21) (0.43) (0.51)
Household size 0.54 0.29 0.55 0.00 0.00 0.00
(1.79) (0.91) (1.93) (0.77) (0.09) (1.29)
Age of head -4.31 3.92 8.77 -0.01 0.53 -0.01
(0.67) (0.57) (1.43) (0.25) (2.00) (0.53)
Age of head squared 1.43 -4.84 -7.57 0.01 -0.47 0.01
(0.27) (0.84) (1.48) (0.37) (2.12) (0.46)
Schooling of head -0.08 -0.03 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00
(1.72) (0.57) (1.42) (0.46) (0.50) (0.35)
Max. school. excl. head 0.02 0.12 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.29) (1.55) (0.11) (1.89) (0.87) (2.16)
Ave. schooling in hh. 0.21 0.04 0.08 0.00 0.01 0.00
(1.58) (0.26) (0.65) (1.98) (1.25) (2.54)
Marital status of head 0.73 0.57 0.37 0.00 0.00 0.00
(2.40) (1.73) (1.29) (0.55) (0.19) (0.39)
Land ownership 0.04 -0.04 0.22 0.00 0.01 0.00
(0.57) (0.67) (3.69) (2.77) (3.09) (2.95)
Joint significance of
household characteristics
28.35 23.66 54.29 14.22 25.52 20.11
Red earth -0.84 -0.98 -0.36 0.00 0.00 0.00
(1.71) (1.86) (0.76) (0.89) (0.08) (0.96)
Sandy soil -1.18 -1.10 -0.70 0.00 0.00 0.00
(4.68) (4.08) (2.91) (0.22) (0.35) (0.48)
“Barren” soil -1.52 -1.65 -0.62 0.00 0.02 0.00
(3.23) (3.28) (1.39) (0.49) (0.87) (0.49)
Irrigated plot 1.80 1.76 1.25 0.00 -0.01 0.00
(6.74) (6.16) (4.93) (1.98) (0.68) (1.10)
Area of plot -0.84 -0.85 -0.87 0.00 -0.01 0.00
(7.46) (6.98) (8.10) (3.02) (2.56) (3.53)
Intercept 2.10 0.44 -4.84 0.01 -0.05 0.01
(1.20) (0.23) (2.92) (1.30) (0.73) (1.42)
2 s 0.00 0.00 0.00
(6.74) (6.32) (6.30)
Number of observations 92 92 92 92 92 9235














e LL -=, 0 L > ,
0 H =
26 8.7 56 7.0
Laborer-cultivator-1 0
e LL ->, 0 L > ,
0 H >
150 50.5 405 50.9
Laborer-cultivator-2 0
e LL ->, 0 L > ,
0 H =
38 12.8 80 10.1
Small capitalist 0
e LL -=, 0 L > ,
0 H >
83 28.0 254 31.9
Table 10. Characteristics of households by class







0 L > ,  0 H =
0
e LL ->,
0 L > ,  0 H >
0
e LL ->,
0 L > ,  0 H =
0
e LL -=,
0 L > ,  0 H >
Family size 6,52 9,00 6,78 6,70
Prime age males (%) 0,30 0,35 0,36 0,31
Prime age females (%) 0,30 0,32 0,33 0,24
Head age 0,55 0,48 0,54 0,49
Head school 1,96 3,51 1,90 4,78
Ave. school 3,79 3,84 3,25 3,48
Max. school 6,93 8,20 6,28 6,94
Land ownership (hectares) 0,43 9,17 1,90 7,15
Marital status of head 1,00 0,87 0,71 0,94
Wealth (Tunisian dinars) 5751 29875 4233 2990736














































































































a+ b +d -1
= -w/r slope
TABLE 11. FIRST STAGE MULTINOMIAL PROBIT (P-VALUES IN PARENTHESES)





Intercept 2.3285 -0.1812 1.5037 1.2847
(0.0743) (0.0804) (0.1183) (0.0639)
Household size 0.1039 -0.1356 0.0603 0.0857
(0.1862) (0.0002) (0.2563) (0.0335)
Age of head -0.0284 0.0270 -0.0105 -0.0148
(0.1414) (0.0123) (0.4696) (0.1795)
Schooling of head 0.1001 0.0675 0.0801 -0.1399
(0.2674) (0.0894) (0.2433) (0.0009)
Ave. schooling in hh. -0.0363 -0.0805 0.0576 0.0701
(0.7217) (0.1718) (0.4936) (0.2634)
Land ownership 0.0886 -0.00303 0.00404 0.000848
(0.0132) (0.0401) (0.2219) (0.5616)
Percentage concordant 79.5 68.1 66.3 65.4
Number of observations 297 297 297 2973738
TABLE 12. TEST FOR SELECTIVE SEPARABILITY: TOTAL LABOR INPUT





Repeated interaction -0.360630 0.178048
(-2.453) (3.263)
Landlord visits 0.025797 -0.021676
(1.437) (-1.555)
% of pre-harvesting costs -0.039507 -0.078245
(-2.074) (-2.051)
% of irrigation costs -0.049571
-2.107
% of plowing costs -0.123314
(-4.964)
% of hired labor costs 0.023189
(0.511)





Prime-age females -0.786037 -0.249267 -0.002024 0.158896
(-4.838) (-3.794) (-0.038) (1.214)
Household size -0.014602 0.018563 0.001182 -0.002074
(-1.577) (1.015) (0.311) (-0.359)
Age of head 0.503211
(1.236)
Age of head squared 0.719649 -0.684326 -0.122125
(2.099) (-1.662) (-1.044)
Schooling of head -0.009228
(-3.323)
Max. school. excl. head -0.001625 0.004398
(-0.548) (1.299)
Ave. schooling in hh. 0.061361 0.024603
(3.202) (3.794)
Marital status of head -0.087740 0.006959
(-3.463) (0.318)
Land ownership -2.921466 0.016387 0.072260 -0.025501
(-3.174) (0.475) (1.617) (-1.410)
Plot characteristics






Irrigated plot 0.041786 0.091727 0.131639
(1.575) (3.009) (2.459)
Area of plot -0.024320 -0.000211 -0.010295 -0.001689
(-2.954) (-1.005) (-3.647) (-1.705)
Intercept -1.804946 -0.259282 0.432005 -0.059634
(-1.921) (-0.456) (1.332) (-0.345)
Inverse Mills ratio 2.373610 0.314220 -0.487567 0.235323
(2.284) (0.755) (-1.416) (1.230)39
Adjusted R-Squared 0.40 0.11 0.41 0.16
Number of observations 54 398 78 219